We evaluate the impact of reimbursement rates on health expenditures, using a natural experiment. For historical reasons, reimbursement rates of public health insurance are higher in the French region Alsace Moselle than in other French regions. For both systems, aliation is compulsory. Individuals moving between Alsace Moselle and the rest of France undergo an exogenous change in reimbursement rates. We use a dierence-in-dierence method on a panel dataset of individuals. Our treatment group consists of individuals changing system, our control group consists of individuals who move between other French regions. We study the impact of reimbursement rates on a broad range of health care expenditures: for dentist and doctor visits, drug consumption, and sickness absenteeism. We nd heterogeneous impacts of reimbursement rates on those items. Overall, higher public reimbursement rates do not lead to an increase in spending for medical care.
Introduction
Faced with the warnings of a committee in charge of monitoring the balance of the National Health Insurance, the French government modies regularly some parameters of the system such as the reimbursement rates, co-payment or the bundle of health goods and services supported by the system. Such modications have a direct impact on the reimbursement paid by public insurance (for a given consumption of health care) but they can have more ambiguous eects on consumption, which also matters for the balance of the public accounts.
We measure the causal impact of a change in public reimbursement rate, which does not necessarily imply a decrease in co-payment. Many individuals also have a complementary insurance on top of public insurance. The choice to have complementary insurance is linked with the reimbursement rate of the public insurance. Then, an increase in public reimbursement rate does not necessarily need to lead to a decrease in co-payment. We do not claim to measure price elasticity of demand for medical care. Rather, we measure how, overall, public insurance reimbursement rates impact consumption.
There is a large literature on the impact of reimbursement rates on health expenditures.
Comparing people's consumption with heterogeneous insurance to evaluate the eect of generosity of insurance on health care consumption is probably misleading. Indeed, endogenous selection is a critical issue when trying to evaluate the impact of reimbursement rates on health care consumption. There is an incentive for people who expect to need more care to get higher reimbursement rates, by choosing a generous private insurance, or by working for a rm with large reimbursement rates. Since the pioneering theoretical work on asymmetric information in the 70's (Akerlof 1970 , Spence 1973 , Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976 ) such selection has been widely studied theoretically. Testable implications of such selection have been more recently investigated (Chiappori & Salanié 2000 , Chiap-pori et al. 2006 , Jullien et al. 2007 , Einav & Finkelstein 2011 ) and the empirical literature on such selection in insurance is now quite large (concerning the specic topic of health insurance, we can mention Manning et al. (1987) , Million et al. (2003) , Buchmueller et al. (2004) , Finkelstein & Poterba (2006) , Jones et al. (2006) , Schokkaert et al. (2010) , Einav & Finkelstein (2011) , Einav et al. (2013) ). Neglecting this issue can lead an overestimate (Manning et al. (1987) , Million et al. (2003) ) or an underestimate (Jones et al. (2006) , Einav & Finkelstein (2011) ) of the impact of increasing health insurance reimbursement rates on heath expenditures.
In the U.S., researchers from the Rand Corporation have addressed this issue using random experiments during the 80's (Manning et al. 1987 , Keeler & Rolph 1988 ) and more recently (Finkelstein et al. 2012 ). To our best knowledge such experiments have never been implemented on a large scale in France, and in other countries they are rare for nancial and practical reasons.
A second group of studies uses changes in rules of compulsory health insurance to compare health care expenditures before and after the change of rule (for instance, Scitovsky & Snyder (1972) , Phelps & Newhouse (1972) , Beck (1974) , Scitovsky & McCall (1977) for the U.S.). In France, no less than forty laws since 1976 have changed the reimbursement rules and funding of the National System Insurance, but to our best knowledge only a few academic publications evaluate the causal impact of such reforms, probably because in the absence of control groups, an exogenous change in insurance cannot be distinguished from any other factor that changes over time. A third group of papers use quasi-experiments to evaluate the eect of reimbursement rates on health care consumption controlling for anti-selection, as Chemin & Wasmer (2008) did for absenteeism or Chiappori et al. (1998) did for physician services in France. The present evaluation belongs to this last group because our identication strategy relies on a quasi-experiment that we will briey detail now. However, one should keep in mind that we do not measure the same eect as most papers that examine insurance eects. We assess a rise in public reimbursement rates, not a rise in total reimbursement rates, which includes complementary insurances.
For historical reasons, some laws are dierent in the French region Alsace Moselle than in the rest of France. The reimbursement rates of public health insurance are higher, and there is no delay for sickness allowances. Individuals moving in and out the Alsace Moselle local system allow us to distinguish the eect of these local laws from the eect of individual heterogeneity. Because moving itself can also impact medical care consumption, we use movers that move from and to other regions than Alsace Moselle as a control group.
We will not estimate a structural model in order to evaluate the impact of the change in a specic price on a specic outcome. Rather we will estimate a reduced form in order to evaluate the global impact of a more generous insurance on various aspects of health care consumption, to give an overall view of how consumption adapts when public reimbursement rates increase. Our outcomes are expenditures for dentist visits, expenditures for doctor visits, drug consumption, and number and duration of sick-leave periods. We nd a positive eect on dentist visits, and a negative eect on drug consumption. We nd no signicant eect on doctor visits and sick-leaves. Chemin & Wasmer (2009) use the Alsace Moselle particular system to evaluate the impact of working-time reduction. They use a Dierence-in-Dierence strategy on surveys in repeated cross-section to control for regional dierences in individual heterogeneity. We use the same setting (Alsace Moselle particularity), but thanks to panel data we use a dierent method to control for individual heterogeneity.
Here the aliations to the two systems (national and local) are compulsory given your place of work. Our quasi-experiment is valid as long as people do not choose to move to Alsace Moselle in order to benet from higher reimbursement rates. Such an assumption could be questionable for close migrations. To check if our results are not led by endogenous selection, we conduct a robustness check without close migrations (individual who move to or from neighboring regions). Results are unchanged.
When public reimbursement rates increase at the market-wide level, and demand increases, in the long run the supply of healthcare is likely to adapt to the rise in demand -more physicians are willing to enter the market, and they will adopt new practices (Finkelstein 2007) . This spillover strengthens the initial rise in demand implied by higher reimbursement rates. A change in public reimbursement rates is also likely to impact the content of packages oered by complementary insurances. Those impacts are hard to capture with a randomized experiment as the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, which increases reimbursement rates of a randomized fraction of the whole population. Opposed to this approach, we compare two regions where reimbursement rates have been high (or low) for a long time, so that the level of supply corresponds to the long-run equilibrium level in each region. When they are non treated (out of Alsace Moselle), our treatment group faces a supply corresponding to a long-run equilibrium with no treatment. When they are treated (in Alsace Moselle), our treatment group faces a supply corresponding to the long-run equilibrium with treatment. Therefore, our results capture general equilibrium eects of the treatment.
Regressing various aspects of health expenditures on the public insurance system, including time-invariant individual eects, we nd that when moving to a system with higher public repayment rates, individuals spend more at the dentist and the same amount for doctor visits, they have more numerous periods of sick-leave without, however, any change in the annual number of sick-leave days, and they decrease their consumption of drugs.
In our case, overall consumption decreases when individuals move to Alsace Moselle. Our results are in line with the fact that health care consumption in Alsace Moselle is close to the national average (Cours des Comptes 2011), which suggests a moderate eect of higher reimbursement rates on health expenditures. Even if it is not possible to rule out the eect of some unobserved regional specicities, our results are robust to the robustness checks and placebo tests we perform to address this issue. In particular, including controls on the supply side using densities of physicians and pharmacies leads to even more provocative results and reinforces our main message: a higher public reimbursement rate does not necessarily lead to higher consumption of medical care.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we present the particularities of public health insurance in Alsace Moselle. In the third section, we discuss our strategy of identication and our estimators. In the fourth section, we describe the data used in estimation. In the two following sections, we present our result and some robustness check.
The last section concludes and discuss the policy implication of our results.
Institutional framework
The territory hereafter named Alsace Moselle is in the North-East of France, and includes one French région, Alsace, and a département, Moselle. They both share a border with Germany. Figure 2 , in Appendix, shows the geographical situation of the Alsace Moselle region in France.
The origin of the particular status of AM local system
Between 1870 and 1918, Alsace Moselle was part of Germany, and German laws were implemented, including Bismarck's social laws, as national compulsory health insurance in 1883. When the region became French in 1918, the inhabitants of Alsace Moselle wanted to preserve their public insurance, but France did not have such a national system. Thus, they maintained Bismarck's laws. A system of local laws (Droit local) was implemented, allowing Alsace Moselle to maintain laws that came from the period when the territory was German. This system was temporary at rst, and then became permanent in 1991
Cours des Comptes (2011) . In 1945, the French national health insurance system was implemented. It applied also to Alsace Moselle, and implemented lower repayment rates.
In 1946, it was decided that the local system in Alsace Moselle would act as a complement of the national system, allowing repayment rates to be higher in Alsace Moselle.
2.2 Details about the local laws 2.2.1 Complementarity with the local system Any individual aliated to the local system is also aliated to the national system. The national system repays a given rate. On top of that, the local system repays part of the amount left for people working in Alsace Moselle. The local regime works as a compulsory complementary insurance scheme.
Conditions to be aliated
From 1998 to 2012, people working in Alsace Moselle, no matter the location of their rm's head oce, and people employed by a rm whose head oce was in Alsace Moselle were beneting from the local regime. From March 2012, an individual has to work in Alsace Moselle to benet. For unemployed people, the aliation depends on their previous employer (Article L235-1 du code de la sécurité sociale). For retired people, the aliation to the local system is possible if they have contributed long enough to the system. They need to have been aliated to the local system either ve years before they retire, or during ten years among the fteen before they retire, or during sixty terms.
Reimbursement rates
The public repayment rates for dentists and doctors (both specialized and non-specialized) are 70% for someone aliated to the general system. Additionally, 20% are repayed by the local system, so that people working in Alsace Moselle face a 90% repayment rate. Repayment rates are also higher for almost all health care expenditures, including drugs, and hospital care expenditures. For drugs, the rates in both systems vary depending on whether the drug is considered essential. It varies between 15% and 100% for both systems, but for most drugs the repayment rate is higher in Alsace Moselle, around 80% or 90%, when it is between 30% and 65% in the rest of France. Those dierences are summarized in Table 1 . Details about the reimbursement rates of the general and the local system can be found in Appendix.
Sick-leave conditions
People aliated to the local system also benet from more generous sick-leave policies.
The employers in Alsace Moselle must pay the employee his or her allowance from the rst day of sick-leave. In the rest of France, there is a waiting period of three days 1 . During those three days, the employer can give benets to the employee, but it is not compulsory.
From the fourth day, the public insurance pays allowances in both cases.
Pharmacy opening
In We can now turn to the econometric specication of our models. We assume that the health care consumption of individual i at year t (y it ) is such that: Last, ε it is the eect of unobserved variables and the main identifying assumption of β is simply the usual exogeneity assumption:
Under a supplementary assumption of independence across individuals, the within estimator of β is consistent. Medical care consumption across time is likely to be serially correlated. If people consume medical care regularly, with time spaces greater than one year, medical care in a given year is negatively correlated with consumption the year before.
For the inference, serial correlation of the dependent variable is taken into account using clusters the individual level (cf. Wooldridge (2002) 
Sample selection
We restrict the sample to individuals for whom we have information about consumption, working situation and place of work during the four years. We lose about 5% of the sample, due to missing information about medical care consumption 4 . We need the place of work to determine who is aliated to the local insurance system of Alsace Moselle. We remove the individuals whose place of work is not always known, 18% of the sample. Finally, we remove individuals whose occupation is not known for the four years, 14% of the sample 5 .
In the end, the sample is reduced to 335,000 individuals.
Identifying who benets from the local regime
The dataset does not contain aliation to the local system. Between 1998 and 2012, the employees of a rm whose head oce is in Alsace Moselle, whatever the place of work, and the employees working in Alsace Moselle could be aliated to the local system 6 . Our criteria for aliation is the county of the rm employing the individual: we consider that someone is aliated to the local system if and only if he or she is working for a rm in Alsace Moselle, either in Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, or Moselle, the three counties of Alsace Moselle. It is accurate for everyone except someone who does not work in Alsace Moselle 4 The observations deleted can be people who did not consume any medical care for three consecutive years. Under those conditions they would exit the dataset. They can also be people dead or who have moved in a foreign country. As we do not know the reason why each person exits the dataset, we have no reliable measure of the outcomes we want to estimate. Removing them, the eects will be estimated only for people who do not have three consecutive periods of non consumption.
but benets from the local system because the head oce of his or her rm is in Alsace
Moselle. For unemployed and retired persons, we have information about the county last employer, which is the criteria for aliation.
Descriptive statistics
In this section, we present descriptive statistics about health care consumption and individual characteristics.
Health care consumption in Alsace Moselle
We give comparative gures for health care consumption of people working in Alsace
Moselle, and people working in the rest of France. We use the restricted sample presented in the previous section. Table 2 presents annual average of the part of expenditures on health care that is repaid by the national insurance system, and annual averages of total expenditure on health care, at the individual level. If one goes to see a general practitioner once during the year and pays 30 euros, the patient's Total amount for doctors visits will be the amount considered by public insurance as the base for repayment, 23 euros, plus extra fees if any (dépassements d'honoraires). The patient's Amount repaid will be the fraction of the total amount that is repaid by the national public insurance, that is, 0.70 * 23 = 15.10 e, irrespective of whether he or she is aliated to the Alsace Moselle local system. Indeed, the national insurance repays the same amount for everyone, and the Alsace local system repays on top, as a compulsory complementary insurance.
The part reimbursed for each medical procedure (15.10 e in our example) excludes any extra fees varying across physicians. If it changes, it means that the individual consumes more or less medical care, not that the price has changed. This measure allows us to quantify costs for the national insurance. For these reasons, we will use the amount repaid Amount repaid: average annual amount repaid by the national public insurance, for dentists visits ( The total amount spent is higher than the part repaid by national insurance, especially for dental care. This gap is generally shared between the individual and his or her complementary insurance, the share depending on the reimbursement rate of the complementary insurance. Acting as a compulsory complementary insurance, Alsace Moselle local regime repays part of the gap for people aliated. Table 2 shows that average annual consumption of medical care are higher in Alsace
Moselle, for dentist visits, doctor visit, and drugs expenditures. All those dierences are signicant (column 3). On the contrary, there is no signicant dierence for visits to specialists.
Concerning sick day absences, our measures do not include the three rst days of sick-leave, because the public insurance does not reimburse anything for those days. The sick-leave periods enter our data only from the fourth day of absence. We use two measures:
the annual number of sick-leave periods and the annual number of sick days. People in Alsace Moselle tend to take more sick-leave periods, and more days of sick-leave. The dierences are signicant.
There are signicant dierence in medical care use in Alsace Moselle and in the rest of
France. The point of our paper is to use a xed eect model to see how those dierences vary when controlling for time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Descriptive statistics about the groups considered
In our model, we will use three groups of individuals. The rst group, hereafter called movers AM, enter or leave Alsace Moselle during the period, and contribute to the estimation of the eect of Alsace Moselle on consumption, to the eect of the move, and to the controls. The second group, called other movers, are movers who move between other regions, never working in Alsace Moselle. They contribute to the eect of the move, and to the controls. Individuals in the third group, non-movers, never change their region of work, and contribute to our model only by contributing to the estimation of the controls.
We will present descriptive statistics about those three groups, about their individual characteristics and their use of medical care (Table 3) . We present those means only for descriptive purpose. Table 3 presents comparisons between movers AM, other movers, and non movers.
Movers to or from Alsace Moselle compared to non-movers Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 shows outcomes for movers AM and non-movers. Column 5 gives the signicance of the dierence. There is a signicant dierence between people moving to or from Alsace However, dierences in age explain only part of the dierence in unemployment rates. We include a dummy for being unemployed in our model, because this is likely to be correlated with the move. Concerning medical care use, movers AM use less care than the non movers.
Dierences are signicant for all items except dental care. The individuals contributing to our estimates of the impact of higher reimbursement rates are not representative of the general population. Therefore, our results apply only to a particular subpopulation. the common trend assumption is more credible for the former group of movers than the latter group of non-movers. Concerning medical care use, movers AM go more often to the dentist, and take more sick-leave periods. For other items, the dierence is not signicant.
At this stage, we do not know if medical care use of movers AM is dierent because of the fact that they spend some periods in Alsace Moselle, or because of dierent unobserved characteristics. We have seen descriptive statistics about the dierent groups that are of interest given our estimation method. Now, we will give a more precise description of medical care use of movers AM and other movers, to assess the validity of our estimation method.
The common trend assumption
Our paper is based on a Dierence-in-Dierence method, comparing medical care use of movers AM with medical care use of other movers. Non movers contribute to the estimation of the controls only.
The Dierence-in-Dierence method we use is based on the common trend assumption:
without the treatment, both groups would have followed the same evolution. As our dataset The common trend assumption, in our case, would be: (1) before they enter treatment, movers AM entering treatment follow the same trend of medical care consumption as the control group, other movers, before they move, and (2), after they leave treatment, movers AM leaving treatment follow the same trend as the control group, after they move. 
For any individual, the sums 2 k=−3 w kit and 
After necessary normalization that could be without loss of generality δ −3 = 0 and δ 0 = 0. The common trend assumption implies that δ 1 = 0 and δ 2 = 0. The p-value of the joint signicance of w 1,it and w 2,it in the model derived from Equation 3 is 0.90 for dentist visits, 0.12 for doctor visits, 0.46 for prescription drug consumption, 0.28 for the number of sick-leave periods, and 0.32 for the total number of sick-leave days.
To conclude, the common trend assumption cannot be rejected with our data when we compare the treated group with the control group using observations that correspond to a period of non treatment.
5 Main Results
Estimation
We run a panel data model with xed eects, as presented in section 3. We control for year xed eects, employment status (employed or unemployed), income, and the impact of changing work location (using all movers). Details about the variables used and the default values can be found in the Appendix. Each regression presents the impact of the treatment, being aliated to the local regime, on one particular health care outcome, namely, expenditures for dentist visits, for doctor visits, for prescription drugs, number of sick-leave periods, and total number of sick-leave days. Table 4 presents the results of the estimation for expenditures for dentist visits, doctor visits (including general and specialist physicians), the number of periods of sick-leave, and the total number of sick days. In the rst column, the explained variable is the annual expenditures for dental care repaid by national insurance for expenditures of individual i.
Working in Alsace Moselle has a signicant impact on this amount. The national insurance repays on average 5.3 euros more for dental expenditures when the movers are in Alsace
Moselle compared to when they are in the rest of France, holding all else constant. The eect is a 10% increase, as the average annual dental care consumption of movers is around 50 euros (Table 3 ).
The treatment eect on annual expenditures for doctor visits repaid by national insurance is not signicant (Table 4 ). People moving in and out of the Alsace Moselle local regime do not change their level of expenditures for doctor visits (including general practitioners and specialists) when they are subject to higher reimbursement rates.
When aliated to the local system, individuals decrease their consumption of prescription drugs by about 20 euros per year. The eect represents about 14% of annual expenditures, if we compare it to the value in Table 3 . People consume less drugs when they are in Alsace Moselle, subject to higher public reimbursement rates.
The possible underlying mechanisms of such a decrease in consumption will be discussed in details in the next Section.
When working in Alsace Moselle, people take 2.7% more sick-leave periods of more than three days (Table 4 ). The eect is only signicant at 10%. This is a 9% increase, as people changing their place of work take on average 0.30 sick-leave periods of more than three days per year (Table 3 ). The eect on the total number of sick-leave days is not signicant. Individuals do not have more sick-leave days in total when subject to a more generous sick-leave policy.
To interpret our results, one has to keep in mind that we do not assess the impact of an increase of total reimbursement rate, but rather an impact of a change in the part reimbursed by public insurance.
Interpretation of the results
We now present some suggestions we can make from the results, about what are the mechanisms driving the changes in consumption, and about the cost of the local regime for the national insurance. First, the results do not support the presence of moral hazard eects on the public reimbursement rate, and suggest that substitution eects happen. Some results indicate that complementary private insurance matters in explaining the results, through its interaction with the reimbursement rates of public insurance. Having a public complementary insurance in one particular region could be costly for national insurance, if people consume more in this region. It is not the case here, where people consume less care in Alsace Moselle, so there is no additional costs for the national insurance.
Unmet needs and moral hazard
In this section, we will not consider non compulsory complementary insurances, and talk instead about moral hazard induced by the presence of a public insurance only. The role of complementary insurances will be discussed in the next section. According to economic theory, more generous reimbursement rates should lead to higher expenditures. We can interpret this impact as a moral hazard eect, negative for public welfare. As the price is low, people over-consume health care, they consume more health care than the socially ecient level. Unmet medical needs can explain the same empirical result, and imply opposite conclusions concerning welfare. If people do not spend enough on health care, this can have adverse eects on a population's health, because of externalities in health care consumption, and on future health spending if preventive care is neglected. Therefore, releasing nancial constraints on health spending could improve welfare.
We studied the impact of lower prices on the consumption of various health items.
Moral hazard and unmet needs are likely to impact particularly dierent items, so we can use the heterogeneity in the impacts to try to understand what is driving the changes in consumption. Dental care expenditures greatly depend on income, and inequalities in access to dental care are sizeable. Dental care is the rst type of health care that is cited when people are asked about unmet needs for nancial reasons, as Fantin et al.
(2012) explain. In France, drug expenditures are particularly high (Sabban & Courtois (2007) ), due to a heavy drug consumption culture. Decreasing drug consumption is an important concern for public policies (Cabut & Clavreul (2012) ). Dentist expenditures and drug consumption are two areas of expenditure that should typically react to higher public repayment rates, but for dierent reasons. Moral hazard should impact more drug consumption, and unmet needs would more likely impact dental care, especially for the poorest households. We nd an increase in dental care consumption, but a decrease in drug consumption. Those results are not consistent with the hypothesis that increasing public repayment rates for drugs worsens over-consumption and moral hazard.
In our case, total health care expenditures decrease when people are subject to higher public reimbursement rates, considering that the total number of sick-leave days and spending for doctor visits are unaected and for the subpopulation of movers.
The drop in drug consumption: substitution eect, regional dierences in supply, or complementary insurances?
We found that people consume less prescription drugs in Alsace Moselle, when facing a higher repayment rate. As other prices of health care decrease too, the drop in prescription drug consumption could be due to substitution eects. The relative price of drugs compared to other health care related goods could be higher in Alsace Moselle, explaining the decrease in consumption. In addition to the drop in drug consumption, being aliated to a more generous system increases the use of two other health care items: the number of sick-leave periods and dental care. Thus, drug consumption may be substituted for dental care and short sick-leave periods. People in Alsace Moselle would consume less prescription drugs because they can consume more dental care and short sick-leave periods, which enables them to take less medicines to treat symptoms like antipyretic or painkillers, for instance.
Our results suggest that it is important to take into account substitution between dierent health care items when measuring the costs of having higher reimbursement rates.
An alternative hypothesis to explain the decrease in drug consumption in Alsace Moselle is the presence of another aspect of the local regime which is unobserved, as dierences in the supply of medical care. Our strategy enables us to rule out regional particularities on the demand side, as we compare consumption of the same persons when in and when out of Alsace Moselle. However, local dierences on the supply side could drive part of the results. Some dierences are investigated in the next Section, namely, the density of physicians and pharmacies. There could also be unobserved dierences in doctors practices across regions.
Complementary private insurance plays an important role in some choices related to health consumption, because for some medical items as dental care, the basis of repayment of the national insurance underestimates the real cost. We use a dierence-in-dierence method, the treatment being aliation to the local system.
Individuals from the control group move as well, but do not change their aliation to the local system. This method relies on the exogeneity of mobility to Alsace Moselle. We will check if this assumption is credible.
Is mobility exogenous?
The validity of our method relies on the exogeneity of the choice to move to or from Alsace
Moselle. As we use a xed eect panel data model, mobility does not need to be exogenous to time-invariant individual heterogeneity, but it needs to be uncorrelated to unobserved time-varying characteristics aecting health care expenditures.
If individuals change their place of work to benet from a more generous system when they anticipate they will have high expenses, our estimates would be positively biased.
This could be the case for dental health care consumption or number of sick-leave periods, for which we nd a positive impact of higher reimbursement rates. Concerning drugs, we nd a negative impact, so if it is biased, the real impact would be a larger negative impact.
To deal with this possible endogeneity, we run the same model, but excluding people who move from or to neighboring areas (namely, Lorraine, or Franche-Comté). If individuals go to a region far away, this would imply high costs in terms of housing or transport, and moving would be more costly than getting an expensive private insurance with a large reimbursement rate. The dierences in reimbursement rates between the Alsace Moselle local system and the French national system only apply to the fraction of expenditures repaid by national insurance, so that the dierence between the two public systems is lower than the dierences between various private insurances. Excluding individuals who move from regions which are close to Alsace Moselle, we keep only moves that are likely to be undertaken for other motives than the reimbursement rates. We select also individuals who move to a region far away in the control group, for the control group to be comparable. The results are similar to the previous ones, there is a positive eect of working in Alsace Moselle on dental consumption, of 5.5. It is no longer signicant. There is still no eect of expenditures for doctors visits, and a negative eect on drug consumption, which is of −25, signicant at 10%. There is no signicant eect on the total number of sick-leave days, and an eect of 0.039 on the number of sick-leave periods, signicant at 5%.
The eects are similar to the ones including close migrations, so that the eects observed are not driven by endogenous mobility. The standard errors are larger because the sample of movers contributing to the eect of Alsace Moselle is smaller when excluding movers to neighboring regions.
Robustness checks
In this section, we change the specication of the model to assess its robustness. We change the controls included, add information about health supply, and apply the same model, but only on the population of movers, people who change their region of work at least once.
The results obtained using these dierent specications are similar to the original results. Nb Ind=334,754. Physicians and pharmacies densities are used as proxies for health care availability.
Sick-leave: number of periods of sick-leave. Sick-days: total number of sick-leave days dividual xed eect. The results of the estimations for dentist visits, doctor visits, drug consumption, number of sick-leave periods and number of sick leave days are presented in row two of Table 6 . We can compare them with the results of the baseline model (with the controls), on row one.
The eect of working in Alsace Moselle on dental consumption is now signicant at 10%, and the magnitude is close to the previous result. Concerning expenditures linked to doctor visits, it is still not signicant. Drug consumption is signicant at 5%, the eect is -22. The eect on the number of sick-leave periods is still 0.03, signicant at 10%. The total number of sick-leave days is still not signicant.
Adding information about chronic diseases We have one aspect of health status in our data, whether the individual is registered as having a chronic disease. We consider the diseases for which the public insurance reimbursement rate is 100%. We did not add chronic diseases in our baseline model, because having a chronic disease at time t could be endogenously related to a low level of consumption of health care until t. For the same reason, including chronic diseases at t − 1 is at best only weakly exogenous. However, results in Table 6 show that our main results are not sensible to the inclusion of such dummies.
Add medical professions density We run the same model, adding medical profession density as controls. We did not add medical density in our main model, because we think density can be endogenous to the demand in the long run. Indeed, if demand is higher in a region, it it likely that supply will adapt. Medical density would be impacted by changes in consumption.
However, our eect could be due to change in supply of care among regions. We want to check if the eect does not vanish when taking into account variability in dentists density, doctors density and pharmacies density.
Both access to health care and induced demand can depend on physician density. Physicians who have less patients because of high density can be willing to increase demand to maintain their income. Density also increases competition between physicians, which can decrease the price of health care. Higher density also decreases the cost of medical care use through the reduction of the average distance of each person to the closest dentist or doctor. Physicians density is high in Alsace Moselle, and pharmacies density is low. Therefore, density of physicians and pharmacies could explain our results, higher expenditures for dentists, lower for drugs.
We run the same model adding doctors density and in each department in 2009 7 .
We do not add doctors who are specialists and dentists because more than 85% of the variation of their density across regions is explained by pharmacies density and general 7 Information about density is at the department level, from public statistics from the Direction de la recherche, des études, de l'évaluation et des statistiques Source : http://www.drees.sante.gouv.fr/IMG/apps/statiss/default.html practitioners density. A model with the four densities used in the X does not change a lot the coecients but increases substantially the estimated standard errors, reecting high degrees of correlation of the four densities.
Row three of table 6 presents the results with physicians density. The coecient on dental care use is now not signicant. The eect on drug consumption is still signicant at 5%. Both coecients are smaller than before, but similar. Coecients on annual number of sick days and spending for doctor visits are now signicant at 5%, and negative.
Working in Alsace Moselle decreases the use of doctor visits and sick days, holding health care availability constant. The eect is −11 euros for doctor visits, and two days less of sick-leave per year. The impact of the number of sick-leave period is not signicant.
The provocative results of a lower consumption of drugs when the public repayment rate is higher cannot be explained simply by the supply side. On the contrary, taking into account the density of physicians and pharmacies leads to even more provocative results!
Placebo tests
We found an eect of changing the place of work on dental care consumption, and drug consumption in Alsace Moselle.
We run the same model on each region, except Corse, and overseas departments. This leaves all 21 regions of mainland France, except Alsace Moselle. On average, if there is zero eect of those regions, we should nd approximately one region signicant at 5%, and one at 10%, for each outcome. The Lorraine region includes Moselle, so we replace it by a region including all subregions of Lorraine but Moselle.
For dental care, two regions have a signicant impact, Haute-Normandie, eect of −4.8, signicant at 5%, and Pays de la Loire, eect of 3.1, signicant at 10%. Concerning drug consumption, there is a signicant eect in three regions. Two are signicant at 5%:
Pays de la Loire, eect of −23.5 and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, eect of 27.4. One is signicant at 10%: Lorraine but Moselle (16.7).
Given that a no impact would result in two signicant regions (at 10%) for each item, and we get two regions for dental care, three for drug consumption, our placebos tests are consistent with the hypothesis that other regions than Alsace Moselle do not impact consumption.
We use another way to have better insight to whether the eects we observed are due to regional particularities or to the local regime. We perform the same model, but using people who change their place of living, not their place of work. The correlation between changing the place of work and the place of residence is quite low, around 0.35. As being aliated to the local system is correlated with the living in the region Alsace Moselle, we want to assess if the eect are indeed due to working in Alsace Moselle and not to living in Alsace Moselle. We estimate the impact of moving to Alsace Moselle only for individuals who do not change their aliation to the local system, that is, who do not change their place of work. Table 7 presents the results of this estimation. Signicance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%. We exclude individuals who change their aliation to the local system from those regressions. 1005 individuals change their place of living from or to Alsace Moselle, without entering or leaving the local system (either always or never working in Alsace Moselle). Dependent variables: dentist denotes the annual amount repaid by the national health insurance for dentists visits, doctor denotes the amounts repaid for doctors (general practitioners and specialists), drugs denotes the amount repaid for prescription drugs, sick-leave denotes the number of periods of sick-leave, sickdays denotes the annual number of sick-leave days. Additional controls included: income, employment status, years xed eects, and controls for the eect moving. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
The result for dental care consumption is similar (4.8), but not signicant. The eect on drug consumption (-1.5) is much lower, and no longer signicant. There is an impact of working in Alsace Moselle on drug consumption, but living in Alsace Moselle has no impact. It seems that it is being aliated to the local system that matters, not local particularities as dierences in supply of care, which would impact people living in Alsace
Moselle as much as people working in Alsace Moselle. The impact on the number of sickleave periods is now just signicant for a level of 10% and negative. The impact on the number of sick-leave days and doctors visits, is, as before, non signicant.
Decomposing the eects
We evaluate how the eects on medical care use vary depending on direction of the move Across individual characteristics To have more insight about the interpretation of our eect and to see if some particular groups of people drive the average impact we measure, we evaluate how the eects vary with individual characteristics. We interact time-invariant characteristics with working in Alsace Moselle. We run models to see how our eect varies with four main characteristics: health status (chronic diseases), age, gender and income.
To summarize, the eect on drugs is higher for males, for persons with chronic diseases, for persons older than forty and for high incomes. But this analysis is conducted separately for each variable, and because these variables are positively correlated (at least for age, male and incomes) it is not clear to determine which of them drives the heterogeneity of the eect of the treatment.
Eects on other measures of health care consumption
To evaluate the eects of changes in total expenses for medical care, we use total expenditures for health care as dependent variables, instead of only the part repaid by the national insurance. Table 8 presents the results. Concerning expenditures for dental care, the coecient is no longer signicant at 5%, and it is higher than the value for the part repaid. The eect on doctor visit expenditures is not signicant. The eect on drug expenditures is -21, signicant at 5%.
Conclusion
We assess whether moving to a region where the public health insurance is more generous impacts individual medical care expenditures, using an administrative panel dataset.
Regressing health expenditures on the public insurance system, controlling for individual xed eects, we nd that individuals moving to a region with higher public reimbursement rates do not consume more care. We argue that reimbursement rates of the public health insurance are not decisive factors aecting medical care use in France, at least for a specic population of movers.
A Details about the local system 
Examens de laboratoire : analyse et prélèvement effectuée par du personnel non praticien ---------------60 % 30 % 90 % 
Frais de transport ----------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------ 70 % 20 % 90 %  Frais d'hébergement, frais de transport -------------- 65 % 65 %  Frais d'hydrothérapie -------------------------------------- 65 % 25 % 90 %
B. BENEFICIAIRES DU FONDS SPECIAL INVALIDITE ET FONDS DE SOLIDRAITE VIEILLESSE
Autres prestations : (honoraires -examens de laboratoire, prothèses, optiques, orthopédie, cure thermale) sauf frais de transport - y it = β 1 Entering i * AM it + β 2 Leaving i * AM it + β 3 Back and forth i * AM it leaving at least once during the period). We want to test whether the three coecients (β 1 , β 2 and β 3 ) are signicantly dierent, for each outcome considered (dentist visits, doctor visits, drug consumption, number and duration of sick-leave periods). Table 10 presents the results.
For all outcomes, the dierence between β 1 , β 2 and β 3 is not signicant, due to the large standard errors. There is a positive eect on dentist visits for the three groups, it is never 
B.3 Across individual characteristics
We assess whether some groups of people drive the eects we measure.
To have more insight about the interpretation of our eect, we evaluate how the eects vary with individual characteristics, and to see if some particular groups of people drive the average impact we measure. We interact time-invariant characteristics with working in Alsace Moselle, for our coecient to measure the eect of Alsace Moselle on medical care use for each group. The composition of groups is time-invariant. We run models to see how our eect varies with four main characteristics: health status (chronic diseases), age, gender and income. y it = β 1 1 (Chronic disease)i * AM it +β 2 1 (No chronic disease)i * AM it + 2 k=−3 δ k w kit +γx it +φ t +α i +ε it , For drug consumption, the impact is much higher for individuals having at least one chronic disease during the period. It is −220, signicant at 5%, whereas it is −2, not signicant, for individuals having no chronic disease along the four years. Concerning dental care, eects are more alike, for individuals with chronic disease, it is 7.6, not signicant, for individual with no chronic disease, it is 5.1, signicant at 10%. Gender We run the following model.
y it = β 1 1 Womeni * AM it + β 2 1 Meni * AM it +
We nd that eect on drug consumption is higher for men (−27, versus −8 for women).
It is signicant for men only. Eect on dental care consumption is similar for men and women (4.7 and 6.1), and not signicant.
Income We run the following model y it = β 1 1 (0 to 6,970)i * AM it + β 2 1 (6,971 to 12,850)i * AM it + β 3 1 (12,851 to 19,005) Concerning drug consumption, the coecient is between 3.8 and 7.8 for all groups, it is never signicant.
Here, we also present the results on sick-days across levels of income. Indeed, our treatment for sick-days is that in Alsace Moselle, there is no waiting period for allowances, whereas there can be one in the rest of France. Many individuals in the rest of France benet from coverage by the employed from the rst day of sick-leave. This coverage is likely to depend on income, high income beneting from more generous labor contracts on average. For our estimates to be meaningful, we exclude periods in which individuals are unemployed during the whole year. We nd an eect of working in Alsace Moselle on annual number of sick-days for the lower level of income considered (below 6, 970), individuals in this group take on average 7.6 more sick-days per year when in Alsace Moselle (signicant
